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Abstract. The present paper investigates the strategic motives that guide the quest for outgroup resources. Resources can be retrieved
through spying and requesting help. Whereas both methods are means of obtaining valued resources from the outgroup, spying secures
the ingroup’s public image, while requesting help potentially damages this image by displaying the ingroup as incompetent and dependent.
Two experiments (N = 99 and N = 99) supported the prediction that, when social change is feasible, members of high status groups spy
more on the lower status group than vice versa. No difference was found in either study in the amount of help requested from the outgroup.
Results from the second study showed that the effect did not occur when status relations were legitimate and thus unlikely to change.
These findings advance our understanding of intergroup helping by demonstrating that strategic motives fundamentally shape aspects of
help-seeking between groups.
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Two determinants of status differentials between groups
are knowledge and know-how, which are becoming in-
creasingly important in the globalized world, because they
provide the holder with power and standing (Wegener,
1992). The production, legitimization, control, and dissem-
ination of knowledge has been shown to reflect status hi-
erarchies both globally (Vorster & Nel, 1995) and within
organizations (Wong, Ho, & Lee, 2008). Interestingly, ex-
isting status differentials based at least partly on knowledge
are also often challenged precisely because the dissemina-
tion of knowledge is more difficult to control than, say, the
distribution of weapons. Intelligence services assert that es-
pionage is on the increase worldwide, and that one of the
most attractive targets is know-how. According to The
Guardian, the British counterintelligence service MI5
states that
In the past, espionage activity was typically directed toward
obtaining political and military intelligence. In today’s high-
tech world, the intelligence requirements . . . include new com-
munication technologies, IT, genetics, aviation, . . . and many
other fields. (Norton-Taylor, 2010)
Nevertheless, to date research has paid little attention to
group members’ motivation to spy on or to request help from
an outgroup in order to maintain or improve the position of
their ingroup. The present paper aims to fill this gap.
The intended consequences of both requesting help and
spying are to provide the ingroup with resources needed to
maintain or to improve its status position. However, where-
as requesting help is potentially damaging to the group’s
public image, spying diminishes this potential because this
behavior cannot be witnessed by the outgroup. Spying
therefore provides an intriguing way to vary the social costs
of falling back on another group’s resources while keeping
its instrumental value constant.
The Psychological Consequences of
Seeking Help
While there is evidence that the willingness to help others
can rest upon empathic concerns (Batson, 1994) and beliefs
of reciprocity (Hardy & van Vugt, 2006), others have dem-
onstrated more strategic motives (Hopkins et al., 2007;
Nadler, Harpaz-Gorodeisky, & Ben-David, 2009; van
Leeuwen, 2007; van Leeuwen & Täuber, 2010). Strategic
motives for providing help to an outgroup include motiva-
tions to exert power (Nadler, 2002; Nadler & Halabi, 2006),
to create a favorable impression of one’s group (van Leeu-
wen & Täuber, 2010), and to restore the meaningfulness of
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a threatened group identity (van Leeuwen, 2007; van Leeu-
wen & Täuber, 2010). Complementing prior research re-
garding strategic motives that drive attempts to provide
outgroups with help, the present research investigates the
strategic motives that drive attempts to benefit from the
outgroup’s knowledge. Specifically, the present paper fo-
cuses on preferences for requesting help and spying on the
outgroup among members of high and low status groups
when the existing status hierarchy is subject to change.
Seeking help can elicit feelings of dependence and infe-
riority (Gilbert & Silvera, 1996), and can have adverse ef-
fects on self-esteem (Nadler, 1991). Consequently, people
often refrain from seeking support even when they clearly
are in need of it (Schneider, Major, Luhtanen, & Crocker,
1996; Wills & DePaolo, 1991). Requests for help appear to
encompass two dimensions: The first dimension defines
the current status difference based on resources such as
technology, knowledge, or materials, thereby emphasizing
the instrumental value of seeking help. The second dimen-
sion defines group status with regard to the public image
of a group, thereby emphasizing the social costs of seeking
help. These two dimensions are inevitably intertwined be-
cause increases in the instrumental value of help are often
accompanied by increases in the social costs associated
with requesting this help (Nadler, 2002). The question why
the groups involved refrain from just asking for the desired
resources might be answered by the interplay between the
instrumental value of the outgroup’s resources and the so-
cial costs associated with help.
Who Is in Need When Status
Relations Are Subject to Change?
Within research on intergroup helping relations, the over-
arching assumption is that members of low status groups
have little to offer to high status groups. The model of in-
tergroup helping relations as power relations (Nadler,
2002) holds that high status groups would not seek help
from low status groups irrespective of whether the groups’
status positions are subject to change. However, research
indicates that in certain situations high status groups can be
in even greater need of resources than low status groups.
For instance, potential changes to the existing status hier-
archy have been shown to be more demanding on members
of high status groups (Scheepers & Ellemers, 2005). The
prospect of change threatens the group’s advantaged posi-
tion because it implies the risk of losing their positive dis-
tinctiveness (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner & Brown,
1978).
Moreover, members of high status groups face higher
performance expectations than members of low status
groups. The need to deliver high performance might further
enhance the need to seek help from the lower status out-
group. We therefore propose that, especially with regard to
novel domains of knowledge, unstable status relations con-
stitute a serious dilemma for high status groups: Group
members can decide either to request the outgroup’s re-
sources at the expense of their own group’s public image
or to secure their public image (by not requesting the out-
group’s resources) at the expense of their own group’s re-
source-based status. Neither option secures their relative
standing. Thus, high group status can become a burden to
group members because the prospect of changing status
relations emphasizes the risk of loosing one’s advantaged
position.
The Strategic Aspects of Seeking Help
Consistent with prior research (Nadler, 2002; Nadler & Ha-
labi, 2006; van Leeuwen & Täuber, 2010; van Leeuwen,
Täuber, & Sassenberg, in press), we suggest that seeking
help from another group potentially conveys the impres-
sion that the ingroup is dependent on and inferior to the
outgroup. Falling back on the outgroup’s resources is asso-
ciated with social costs to the extent that this can be wit-
nessed by the outgroup. Consequently, the social costs in-
volved in seeking another group’s resources differ substan-
tially depending on whether this behavior is overt
(requesting help) or covert (spying).
This proposition is consistent with research on providing
support. Because providing support reflects positively on
the provider, the willingness to give support should in-
crease when an audience is present to witness this behavior.
Research has indeed shown that visibility strongly affects
the willingness to give help (Campbell & Slack, 2006; Ha-
ley & Fessler, 2005). For example, Campbell and Slack
(2006) found that highly visible organizations give more
cash donations than less visible organizations, as deter-
mined by comparing the organization’s giving rate in rela-
tion to their pretax profits (Campbell & Slack, 2006). In
fact, the effects of behavioral visibility on helping are so
ingrained that mere cues of an audience are enough to trig-
ger more generous behavior, even when behavior in effect
remains anonymous (Haley & Fessler, 2005).
Conversely, the willingness to request resources should
decrease when an audience is present to witness this behav-
ior, because it potentially reflects negatively upon the re-
questers’ reputation due to its connotations with inferiority
and dependency (Gilbert & Silvera, 1996; Nadler, 2002).
This assumption received empirical support with respect to
interpersonal requests for help. Ryan, Pintrich, and Midg-
ley (2001) showed that pupils who were in need of support
avoided seeking help due to concerns about their public
self-esteem. With regard to intergroup contexts, however,
research has not yet investigated the impact of visibility on
the willingness to request resources from an outgroup.
Moreover, the possibility that members of high status
groups might fall back on the resources of a lower status
group by requesting resources has not yet been addressed.
S. Täuber & E. van Leeuwen: Requesting Outgroup Help or Spying 99
© 2012 Hogrefe Publishing Social Psychology 2012; Vol. 43(2):98–107
The Present Research
Based on the observation that potential changes to the ex-
isting status hierarchy are more demanding for members of
high compared to low status groups, we expect that mem-
bers of high and low status groups would differ in their
preferences for requesting help and spying on the outgroup.
Specifically, we propose that, when structural features of
the intergroup context indicate that the status hierarchy is
subject to change, spying is preferred over requesting help,
and this relation will be more pronounced among members
of high compared to low status groups. Of particular inter-
est in our studies is therefore not the overall difference be-
tween the amount of overt vs. covert information seeking,
but how this difference is moderated by group status.
We developed an experimental paradigm that allowed us
to vary whether quests for information from the outgroup
are overt vs. covert. With this paradigm, the instrumental
value of the outgroup’s resources was kept constant, while
the social costs that accompany the pursuit of these resourc-
es were varied experimentally. We conducted two studies
to investigate the impact of group status on preferences for
requesting help vs. spying. The intergroup context was de-
scribed (Study 1) and manipulated (Study 2) in such a way
that it emphasized the feasibility of changes to the experi-
mentally created status differential.
Study 1
Study 1 compared preferences for requesting help vs. spy-
ing between members of experimentally created low and
high status groups. It was hypothesized that preferences for
spying over requesting help would be more pronounced
among members of high compared to low status groups.
Method
Participants and Design
A group of 99 students of the VU University Amsterdam
(VU; 64 women, 35 men, Mage = 21.00, SD = 3.78) took
part in the experiment. Participants were randomly as-
signed to the conditions of a 2 (Group Status: high vs. low)
× 2 (Help Type: requesting vs. spying) between-subjects
design.
Procedure and Dependent Measures
Upon entering the laboratory, participants were seated in
closed cubicles in front of a computer that was used to
present instructions, tasks, and questions, and to register
the answers. Participants were told that they were part of
a team of three students of the VU that was connected
with a team of three students of the University of Am-
sterdam (UA). Because only these two universities exist
in Amsterdam, categorization as a student of one or the
other provides meaningful group boundaries for the par-
ticipants. A competitive setting was induced by asking
participants to try to answer more questions correctly
than the UA team in the knowledge quiz. We introduced
an additional goal by announcing that the teams’ joint
performance would be compared to that of other paired
teams from different university cities. We thereby created
a situation that contained both competitive and coopera-
tive motives, with the goal of making requests for the
outgroup’s resources more plausible. Further, to avoid
personal outcomes coming into focus, it was emphasized
that participants’ outcomes (i.e., points gained in the
knowledge quiz) were entirely group-based.
In a first round, participants took part in a knowledge
quiz consisting of 15 questions adapted from Trivial Pur-
suit.1 In order to lend credibility to the performance feed-
back that would be provided afterward (the group status
manipulation), the questions presented to participants in
the low group status condition were, unbeknown to the
participants themselves, pretested to be somewhat more
difficult than those presented to participants in the high
status condition. After this first task it was announced
that the VU team had performed better (in the high status
condition) or worse (in the low status condition) than the
UA team.
Following the status manipulation, a second round of
the knowledge task was announced, for which partici-
pants again were asked to outperform the other group. It
was explained that members of both teams would have
the opportunity to seek answers from the other team if
they did not know the answer to a question themselves.
Participants could decide for each knowledge question to
either answer it on their own or to seek the answer from
the other team. Participants in the requesting help condi-
tion were informed that, upon requesting an answer, a
message would be created to be presented to the other
team at the end of the task (in order not to interrupt them),
in which they were requested to share their answer. In
order to ensure comparability with the spying condition,
participants in the requesting help condition were assured
that their requests for help could not be denied by the
other team. Participants in the spying condition were in-
formed that, when seeking an answer from the other
team, the other team would not be aware of their request.
The requested answers would automatically be collected
from the data file in which the other team’s answers were
stored and sent to participant’s team without the knowl-
edge of the other team.
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 The difficulty of all Trivial Pursuit questions used in this experiment was pretested.
During this second round, 30 questions of medium dif-
ficulty were presented to the participants. Consequently,
the second task became easier compared to the first task in
the low group status condition, whereas it became more
difficult in the high group status condition. This procedure
was intended to create a sense of instability of status posi-
tions.2 Participants were also informed that the requests
sent to their team from the other team would be stored in a
separate file until their own team had finished working on
the knowledge quiz. With this procedure, we aimed to pre-
vent reciprocity issues from affecting the data collection.
Following the Trivial Pursuit game, a brief questionnaire
was administered. Two questions (1 = not well at all, 7 = very
well) examined whether the status manipulation was success-
ful (“How well did the VU team perform during the first
task?” and “How well did the UA team perform during the
first task?”). One question (1 = not at all, 7 = very much)
examined whether participants correctly perceived that the
other group was aware or unaware of their quests for resourc-
es (“To what extent were members of the UA team aware of
the number of times their answers were requested?”).
Results
Unless otherwise indicated, all variables were analyzed in
separate analyses of variance with “Group Status” and
“Help Type” as between-subject factors. All significant ef-
fects are reported. Significant interactions were further ex-
plored using tests for simple main effects.
Manipulation Checks
A main effect of Group Status was found for the perception
of ingroup performance, F(1, 95) = 119.91, p < .001, ηp2 =
.56. Participants in the high group status condition indicat-
ed to a greater extent that their team performed better than
the other team (M = 5.20, SD = 0.86) than did participants
in the low group status condition (M = 2.82, SD = 1.27). A
main effect of Group Status was also observed for the per-
ception of outgroup performance, F(1, 95) = 140.58, p <
.001, ηp2 = .60. Participants in the high group status condi-
tion indicated that the other team performed better than
their own team to a lesser extent (M = 3.28, SD = 0.76) than
did participants in the low group status condition (M = 5.14,
SD = 0.82). The outgroup’s perceived awareness of the in-
group’s requests also yielded a main effect of Help Type,
F(1, 95) = 21.68, p < .001, ηp2 = .19. Participants in the
requesting help conditions indicated awareness of the out-
group that information was being requested to a greater
extent (M = 3.47, SD = 1.50) than did participants in the
spying conditions (M = 2.04, SD = 1.53). In conclusion, the
manipulations of both Group Status and Help Type can be
considered successful.
Seeking Answers
The analysis of the number of times an answer was sought
revealed a main effect of Help Type, F(1, 95) = 27.83, p <
.001, ηp2 = .23, which was qualified by the expected inter-
action with Group Status, F(1, 95) = 4.58, p = .035, ηp2 =
.05. Participants were in general more willing to spy on the
outgroup (M = 15.72, SD = 5.40) than to request help (M
= 10.65, SD = 4.40), but this pattern was more pronounced
among members of high compared to low status groups.
Figure 1 depicts the relevant means. Members in the high
group status conditions spied more answers (M = 17.68, SD
= 5.78) than members in the low group status conditions
(M = 13.76, SD = 4.26), F(1, 95) = 7.46, p = .005, ηp2 =
.14, whereas no difference was found between high and
low status groups in the amount of requested help, F(1, 95)
= 0.02, ns. This finding supports the prediction that salience
of social costs has a stronger impact on willingness to seek
outgroup resources among members of high compared to
low status groups.
Consistent with expectations, the quest for answers was
highest among participants in the high group status condi-
tion when the social costs associated with this behavior
were low and thus when spying was possible. In fact, par-
ticipants in this condition spied on the outgroup for signif-
icantly more than 15 out of 30 questions, t(24) = 2.32, p =
.029.
Figure 1. Preferences for seeking help vs. spying as a func-
tion of Group Status, Study 1.
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 We can indeed show that, with regard to the first set of 15 questions, significant differences exist for the number of questions answered
correctly, F(1, 97) = 118.74, p < .001. Participants in the high group status condition answered more questions correctly (M = 7.80, SD =
2.44) compared to participants in the low group status condition (M = 3.04, SD = 1.86). With regard to the second set of 30 questions, no
difference between the high and low group status condition was found with regard to the number of questions answered correctly, F(1, 97)
< 1.50, ns.
Discussion
Study 1 provided an explicit test of the proposition that
the social costs associated with seeking outgroup re-
sources exert a greater impact on members of high than
of low status groups. The findings support our notion that
challenges to the existing status hierarchy create a strong-
er need for the resources of other groups among members
of high compared to low status groups. Members of the
high status groups spied significantly more on the lower
status outgroup than vice versa, indicating that members
of high status groups are aware of the dilemma they face
when the status hierarchy is subject to change: They need
the resources of the outgroup in order to preserve their
advantaged standing, though requesting resources in it-
self potentially impairs their public image by communi-
cating dependence on the outgroup. In summary, whereas
a general preference to spy on over requesting help from
the outgroup was evident, this preference was much more
pronounced among members of the high status group.
Why did members of a low status group not take the
chance to improve their group’s relative standing, espe-
cially when falling back on the outgroup’s resources was
associated with low social costs (i.e., when they could
spy)? Nadler’s (2002) model of intergroup helping rela-
tions as power relations offers a plausible interpretation
of this finding. When status differentials are stable, mem-
bers of low status groups are expected to be willing to
seek help from the higher status outgroup. Therefore, we
believe that the observed reluctance to seek help from the
higher status outgroup’s can be interpreted as an attempt
to challenge the experimentally created status differen-
tial. This view is supported by the general greater will-
ingness to spy on the outgroup than to request help evi-
dent across status conditions: It indicates that members
of low status groups are also concerned about their
group’s public image.
An alternative explanation for our findings is that par-
ticipants acted according to what they perceived as nor-
mative when belonging to a group publicly known as
having high or low knowledge. Thus, participants might
have inferred what is normative behavior from their be-
longing to a high or a low status group. Groups that have
knowledge should mainly provide, but not request an-
swers, whereas groups with less knowledge should main-
ly request answers. However, if this alternative explana-
tion were responsible for our findings, we would have
expected a main effect of group status on the overall level
of requests for answers in the opposite direction to what
was evident.
Study 2
The first study investigated the prediction that, when sta-
tus relations are subject to change, members of high sta-
tus groups experience a greater need for the instrumental
benefits of help, yet are more reluctant to request it out
of fear of damaging their good reputation. Study 2 was
set up to experimentally examine the assumption that
such a dilemma exists mainly when social change is fea-
sible, but  not when  status relations are  unlikely to
change. We therefore manipulated the legitimacy of the
status distinction in Study 2. When status relations are
legitimate, group members are more likely to accept the
status quo. By contrast, when status differences are
viewed as illegitimate, members of low status groups
might be challenged by the prospect of change, whereas
members of high status groups may experience threat and
be motivated to preserve the status quo (Ellemers, Wilke,
& van Knippenberg, 1993).3
The paradigm used in the second study was compara-
ble to that used in the first study, with the exception that
information seeking was manipulated within subjects.
Participants were given the opportunity to request out-
group help, spy on the outgroup, or attempt to answer the
knowledge questions by themselves. Based on the results
from the first study, we did not expect to find a difference
regarding the amount of requests for help. However, with
respect to spying, we expected that members of high sta-
tus groups would spy more on the outgroup when status
relations are illegitimate compared to when they are le-
gitimate, whereas no such difference was expected for
members of low status groups. Consequently, members
of illegitimate high status groups were expected to an-
swer fewer questions by themselves than members of le-
gitimate high status groups, whereas the reverse pattern
was expected for members of low status groups.
Method
Participants and Design
A group of 99 students of the VU University Amsterdam
(VU; 66 women, 33 men, Mage = 21.21, SD = 4.58) took
part in the experiment. Participants were randomly as-
signed to the conditions of a 3-way mixed design with
Group Status (high vs. low) and Legitimacy (high vs. low)
as between-subjects factors and Help Type (request vs. spy
vs. no help) as within-subjects factor.
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 On a theoretical note, we do not intend to equate instability of status differences (Study 1) with illegitimacy of status differences (Study 2).
However, previous theorizing on intergroup helping relations (Nadler, 2002) assumes that instability and illegitimacy have essentially the
same effects on help-seeking. Similarly, based on social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978), Ellemers (1993) argued that perceived illegitimacy
of group status might increase the impression that the status hierarchy is unstable, and that perceived instability of group status might
diminish the perception that the status differential is legitimate.
Procedure and Dependent Measures
The procedure was similar to that of Study 1, with a few
exceptions: Group membership was based on region of res-
idence, instead of university. Participants were first asked
to indicate in which region of The Netherlands they cur-
rently studied: North, East, South, or West. All participants
(correctly) indicated studying in the West (= ingroup). Par-
ticipants were informed that they were part of an online
national survey into the geographical spread of knowledge
in the country. After a short waiting period, they were con-
nected to 2 other students from their own region to form a
3-person team (“Team West”). It was explained that the
performance of Team West would be compared to another
3-person team from a randomly chosen other region (East,
North, or South). In the first round of the knowledge quiz,
each team member would be presented with 15 multiple
choice knowledge questions, each with four answer op-
tions. Contrary to Study 1, questions in the high group sta-
tus condition were identical to those in the low group status
condition. The total number of correct answers within each
team would constitute the team’s performance or knowl-
edge level, which would be compared to that of the other
team that had worked on the same task.
Upon finishing the first task, participants learned that the
national average performance was 29 correct answers (out
of 45). Next, they could click on a graph after which the
teams’ performance levels were displayed. Participants’
team always received a score of 37 or 21, which always
differed either 1 point (illegitimate status difference) or 17
points (legitimate status difference) from the other team. In
the legitimate low group status condition, participants
learned that their team had a total of 21 correct answers,
compared to 38 for the other team. The participants’ team
had thus not only performed worse than the other team, but
also below the national average, whereas the other team
had performed above the national average. In the illegiti-
mate low group status condition, participants were in-
formed that their team had a total of 37 correct answers,
compared to 38 for the other team. In both conditions, the
program continued by concluding that, because the partic-
ipants’ team was outperformed by the other team, the par-
ticipants’ team would from there on be referred to as “the
worse team” and the other team as “the better team.”
Although participants’ team in the illegitimate condition
was still outperformed by the other team, the difference was
small; more importantly, the participants’ team had per-
formed above the national average, which would render the
label “worse team” as unjustified and illegitimate. In the
legitimate high group status condition, the scores were 37
for participants’ team and 20 for the other team, and in the
illegitimate high group status condition, the scores were 21
for participants’ team and 20 for the other team, and par-
ticipants’ team was always referred to as “the better team.”
With this procedure, we closely followed the experimen-
tal procedure employed by Ellemers (1993). Specifically,
our procedure followed the notion that status differences
are perceived as illegitimate when they do not reflect dif-
ferences in competence (see Ellemers, 1993, p. 48). Partic-
ipants in the illegitimate status conditions learned that their
group’s competence differed only by one point from the
other group’s competence, a difference that did not justify
the assignment of higher or lower group status.
The second task was then introduced, including the op-
portunity to request information from the other team. The
task consisted of 30 multiple-choice questions. Participants
were given three behavioral options with each knowledge
question:
1. To send a message to the other team requesting their an-
swer (request),
2. to get the other team’s answer without their knowledge
(spy),
3. to answer the question by themselves without aid (no
help).
Participants learned that if they would seek an answer from
the other team (either as a request or through spying), the
question could be skipped for the moment and be complet-
ed at the end of the quiz. Parallel to the procedure of Study
1, if they decided to spy on the other group, the requested
answers could automatically be collected from the data file
in which the other team’s answers were stored and sent to
participant’s team without the knowledge of the other team.
As in Study 1, we emphasized that participants’ outcomes
were entirely group based.
Upon finishing the second round, the group filled out a
short questionnaire. Performance feedback was checked by
asking participants the extent to which they agreed with the
statements (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) that “. . . their
own team’s performance in the first round was consider-
ably higher than the national average” (ingroup perfor-
mance), and that “. . . the other team’s performance in the
first round was considerably higher than the national aver-
age” (outgroup performance). The perceived legitimacy of
the status difference was assessed with four items (e.g.,
“The distinction between a high knowledge team and a low
knowledge team as introduced after the first round is not
entirely justified,” “I did not agree with the classification
of my team as a team with high/low knowledge”; 1 = com-
pletely disagree, 7 = completely agree). The items were
averaged into a single scale (α = .81). Perceived ingroup
knowledge was assessed  with  one item  (“How much
knowledge do you think the members of your own team
possess?”; 1 = very little, 7 = very much). After finishing
the questionnaire, participants were paid, thanked, and de-
briefed.
Results
Unless otherwise indicated, all variables were analyzed in
full factorial analyses of variance with Group Status and
Legitimacy as independent variables. All significant effects
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are reported. Significant interactions were further explored
using tests for simple main effects.
Manipulation Checks
Analysis of ingroup performance score revealed a signif-
icant interaction, F(1, 95) = 246.60, p < .001, ηp2 = .72.
Participants in the low group status condition more
strongly agreed with the statement that their own team’s
performance was higher than the national average when
the status difference was illegitimate (M = 5.21, SD =
1.41) than when it was legitimate (M = 1.70, SD = 0.87),
F(1, 95) = 117.60, p < .001, ηp2 = .55. Participants in the
high group status condition less strongly agreed with this
statement when the status difference was illegitimate (M
= 1.86, SD = 1.08) than when it was legitimate (M = 5.65,
SD = 1.19), F(1, 95) = 129.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .58. Anal-
ysis of outgroup performance revealed a significant main
effect of Group Status, F(1, 95) = 81.66, p < .001, ηp2 =
.43. Participants in the low group status condition more
strongly agreed with the statement that the other team’s
performance was higher than the national average (M =
5.47, SD = 1.39) than did participants in the high group
status condition (M = 2.08, SD = 1.50). These results
show that participants accurately understood and recalled
the performance feedback.
Analysis of ingroup knowledge yielded a main effect of
Group Status, F(1, 95) = 5.14, p = .026, ηp2 = .05. Partici-
pants in the high group status condition indicated that their
own team was more knowledgeable (M = 4.10, SD = 0.90)
than participants in the low group status condition (M =
3.59, SD = 1.31). Analysis of perceived legitimacy of the
status difference revealed a main effect of Legitimacy,
F(1, 95) = 81.66, p < .001, ηp2 = .43. Participants in the
illegitimate condition more strongly believed that the status
distinction was illegitimate (M = 5.39, SD = 1.10) than did
participants in the legitimate condition (M = 3.35, SD =
1.11). Together, these results demonstrate that both manip-
ulations were successful.
Seeking Answers
Help-seeking was analyzed in a mixed-model analysis of
variance with Group Status and Legitimacy as between-
subjects factors and the number of times participants spied
on the outgroup and answered a question by themselves
without seeking help as within-subjects factor (Help Type).
The interaction between Group Status, Legitimacy, and
Help Type was significant, F(1, 95) = 11.05, p = .001, ηp2
= .10. The interaction was explored with separate univari-
ate analyses.
Analysis of the number of times participants spied on
the outgroup yielded a significant interaction effect,
F(1, 95) = 6.05, p = .016, ηp2 = .06. The means are pre-
sented in Figure 2. In the low group status conditions, the
difference in spying between the illegitimate and the le-
gitimate conditions was not significant, F(1, 95) = 1.64,
ns, but in the high group status conditions, participants
with illegitimate high group status spied significantly
more on the outgroup than did participants with legiti-
mate high group status, F(1, 95) = 4.76, p = .032, ηp2 =
.05. These results thus confirm our hypothesis. We fur-
ther explored this interaction by conducting tests for the
simple main effect of Group Status separately in the le-
gitimate and illegitimate conditions. This effect was mar-
ginally significant only in the illegitimate conditions,
F(1, 95) = 3.61, p = .061, ηp2 = .04. Replicating the find-
ings of Study 1, participants with high group status spied
more (M = 6.14, SD = 4.16) than did participants with
low group status (M = 4.21, SD = 3.44). In the legitimate
conditions, no effect of Group Status was observed,
F(1, 95) < 2.50, p > .11.
The analysis of the number of times participants an-
swered a question without aid also yielded a significant
interaction effect, F(1, 95) = 11.74, p = .001, ηp2 = .11
(see Figure 3). Participants in the illegitimate high group
status condition answered fewer questions by themselves
Figure 2. Number of spied answers as a function of Group
Status and Legitimacy, Study 2.
Figure 3. Number of answers given without help as a func-
tion of Group Status and Legitimacy, Study 2.
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than did participants in the legitimate high group status
condition, F(1, 95) = 5.51, p = .021, ηp2 = .05. Partici-
pants in the illegitimate low group status condition an-
swered more questions by themselves than did partici-
pants in the legitimate low group status  condition,
F(1, 95) = 6.26, p = .014, ηp2 = .06.
The number of times participants requested an answer
was not affected by the manipulations, as expected (all
p’s > .18). Overall, and in replication of the findings of
Study 1, participants spied significantly more answers (M
= 4.91, SD = 3.50) than they requested answers (M =
3.00, SD = 3.30), t(98) = 3.43, p < .001, and both were
significantly less frequent than the number of times they
attempted to answer questions by themselves (M = 22.09,
SD = 3.95); t(98) = 25.55, p < .001, and t(98) = 29.79, p
< .001, respectively.
Discussion
Study 2 directly compared preferences for requesting help
and spying on the outgroup when the status differential be-
tween groups was legitimate or illegitimate. We have sug-
gested that group members are more likely to accept the
status quo when the existing status differential is legitimate.
Consistent with this, when status relations were legitimate,
different preferences for requesting help or spying were not
evident among members of low and high status groups. By
contrast, status relations viewed as illegitimate emphasize
the potential for changes in the existing status hierarchy
(Ellemers et al., 1993). Such changes are associated with
the possible loss of their current advantaged position for
members of high status groups and more with a possible
improvement of their current disadvantaged position for
members of low status groups (Scheepers & Ellemers,
2005). We therefore expected that the illegitimate condi-
tions would be more demanding for members of high as
compared to low status groups.
Supporting this reasoning, members of high status
groups were more willing to spy than to request help from
the outgroup when the status differential was illegitimate.
As expected, no preference for spying or requesting help
was evident among members of low status groups. The pat-
tern of results found for the illegitimate conditions repli-
cates the findings of Study 1 and attests to the notion that
possible changes to the existing status hierarchy are more
demanding for members of high compared to low status
groups.
General Discussion
The present research investigated determinants of the mo-
tivation to spy on and to request help from an outgroup. As
researchers point out, “intellectual content has become the
major factor in comparative trade advantage” (Vorster &
Nel, 1995; p. 52). Yet we know relatively little about when,
why, and how members of high and low status groups fall
back on the intellectual resources of other groups. Prior
research showed that strategic motives can guide the pro-
vision of help to outgroups (Hopkins et al., 2007; Nadler,
2002; van Leeuwen, 2007; van Leeuwen & Täuber, 2010).
The studies presented in the current paper provide empiri-
cal evidence for the impact of strategic motives on requests
for resources in intergroup contexts. In two experiments,
we tested the notion that the prospect of change to the status
hierarchy elicits a greater motivation to spy on than to re-
quest help from an outgroup among members of high com-
pared to low status groups.
Study 1 compared the amount of requests for help and
spying between experimentally created high and low status
groups when the existing status hierarchy was subject to
change. As expected, the preference to spy on versus to
request help from the outgroup was more pronounced
among members of the high than among the low status
group. Study 1 thus supported the notion that members of
high status groups experience potential changes to the sta-
tus hierarchy as more demanding. As a consequence, they
are more aware of the potential damage to their public im-
age that is inherent to requesting help from a lower status
outgroup. Study 2 directly compared preferences for re-
questing help and spying between groups that had an ex-
perimentally created legitimate and illegitimate high or low
status. Because illegitimacy indicates that existing status
differences are insecure (Ellemers et al., 1993; Tajfel &
Turner, 1979), we expected that members of high status
groups would prefer spying over requesting help in the il-
legitimate, but not in the legitimate, conditions. The results
supported this notion: When the status differential was le-
gitimate, the amount of spied and requested answers did
not differ between members of high and low status groups.
Conversely, when the status differential was illegitimate,
members of high, but not of low, status groups preferred
spying over requesting help. Taken together, both studies
supported the prediction that a preference for ways to ben-
efit from the outgroup’s resources without jeopardizing the
ingroup’s public image is more pronounced among mem-
bers of high than among low status groups when status re-
lations are insecure.
The experimental paradigm used allowed us to address
the question whether preferences for spying are specific for
members of high status groups. One might argue that our
results basically show evidence for the willingness of high
status groups to exploit low status groups. Recent research
suggests that members of high status groups might feel en-
titled to take advantage of the system that surrounds them
and that is being dominated by ingroup members who
might turn a blind eye to nonnormative measures to protect
high group status (Saguy, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2008; Saguy,
Pratto, Dovidio, & Nadler, 2009). However, our data do not
lend support to a general tendency for “sinful” behavior
among members of high status groups. We directly com-
pared the effects of secure and insecure status positions on
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preferences to spy over requesting help in Study 2. Consis-
tent with expectations, this preference was evident only
when illegitimacy of the advantaged status position indi-
cated that changes to the status hierarchy are feasible.
We did, however, find a general preference for spying
over requesting help in both studies. This is not surpris-
ing, given that also members of low status groups can be
expected to be concerned about their group’s resources
and public image. However, compared to members of
high status groups, members of low status groups expe-
rience the prospect of change regarding the status hierar-
chy as less demanding than members of high status
groups (Scheepers & Ellemers, 2005). Therefore, we ar-
gued that they feel a lesser need to secure their group’s
resources and its public image simultaneously. Findings
of Study 2 support this notion by showing that members
of the high status group spied significantly more when
the potential for changes in the status hierarchy was high
(i.e., when status relations were illegitimate), compared
to when it was low (i.e., when status relations were legit-
imate). By contrast, the amount of spied answers was not
affected by the legitimacy of status relations among
members of the low status group.
Importantly, the observed lower motivation to fall
back on the outgroup’s resources does not indicate that
members of low status groups do not take up their chance
for change. The model of intergroup helping relations as
power relations (Nadler, 2002) provides a theoretical
framework to interpret the low status groups’ behavior.
Central to this framework is the notion that the willing-
ness to seek help communicates agreement with the low-
er status position of the ingroup. Therefore, by means of
not falling back on the outgroup’s resources, members of
the lower status group can communicate their disagree-
ment with the existing status hierarchy. The number of
answers participants gave without falling back on the out-
group supports this interpretation: Members of the low
status group solved significantly more questions without
help when status relations were illegitimate, thereby
demonstrating their independence from the higher status
outgroup’s intellectual resources.
An alternative explanation for our results might be that
participants acted on norms that they inferred from the
study contexts. Specifically, participants in the low status
groups might have concluded that requesting answers
from the high status outgroup is the normative way to act.
Conversely, participants in the high status groups might
have concluded that requesting answers from the low sta-
tus outgroup is not particularly beneficial. Such a ratio-
nale would have been evident in a main effect of group
status, with members of low status groups generally re-
questing more resources from members of high status
groups than vice versa. Such an effect, however, was not
evident in the studies.
The results of both studies support the assumption that
members of high and low status groups react very differ-
ently to challenges of the current status hierarchy. This is
consistent with research demonstrating that members of
high and low status groups differ substantially in their
goals and needs (Bergsieker, Shelton, & Richeson, 2010;
Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, & Carmi, 2009).
Bergsieker and colleagues (Bergsieker et al., 2010), for
instance, showed that, in interracial encounters, members
of majority groups want to be liked by the minority
group, whereas members of the minority group want to
be respected by the majority group. Thus, members of
majority and minority groups pursue very different goals
in the same situation. In a similar vein, Shnabel and his
colleagues (Shnabel et al., 2009) showed that members
of victimized groups have different needs than members
of perpetrator groups in reconciliation contexts: Whereas
the victims are in need of empowerment, the perpetrators
are in need of acceptance. Both groups were more willing
to reconcile when they perceived that their respective
needs had been satisfied (Shnabel et al., 2009). The de-
mands that possible changes to the status hierarchy elicit
especially for members of advantaged groups have also
been addressed in research by Saguy and colleagues
(2008, 2009). Their studies show that members of advan-
taged groups are particularly motivated to talk about
commonalities between their group and the disadvan-
taged group. According to the authors, emphasizing com-
monalities between the groups implies that nothing needs
to change regarding their respective positions in the sta-
tus hierarchy (Saguy et al., 2008, 2009). Our research
takes this one step further by showing that the prospect
of changes to the status hierarchy directly impacts on be-
havior.
To conclude, precisely because today’s world is chang-
ing so rapidly do we need a better understanding of how
members of high and low status groups react to possible
changes in the status hierarchy. Events such as the global
financial crisis affect nations worldwide, and they chal-
lenge existing status hierarchies. Our findings indicate that
these situations elicit a high motivation to secure their ad-
vantaged position among members of high status groups –
with or without consent of the lower status outgroup. Our
studies complement prior research on the strategic motives
that come into play in the provision of help between groups
(Hopkins et al., 2007; Nadler & Halabi, 2006; Nadler et al.,
2009; van Leeuwen & Täuber, 2010) by showing that stra-
tegic motives also affect requests for resources from out-
groups. The research presented here suggests that members
of high status groups are aware of the difficult choice be-
tween securing their group’s relative standing and securing
their group’s public image: It appears that high group status
can indeed sometimes become a burden.
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